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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
The individuals who have agreed to
participate in this brief are 29 law professors who
teach and write about administrative law. They
have no interest in these cases or the parties except
in their capacities as teachers and scholars. Their
names and affiliations appear in an Addendum to
this brief. They are filing this brief in support of
neither party in order to call the Court’s attention
to pragmatic considerations of which the Court
should be aware in deciding the question
presented. Some of the amici believe that
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are inferior
officers, while others believe that they are properly
treated as employees.
All of us agree that,
whatever the Court’s conclusion, the result must
continue to protect the independence of ALJs,
consistent with the goal of the Administrative
Procedure Act which created their positions.
INTRODUCTION
After presiding at a hearing, an ALJ
employed by the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC) wrote an Initial Decision in
which he determined that petitioners Raymond J.
Lucia et al. (Lucia) violated statutes implemented
by the SEC. Lucia exercised its right pursuant to
This brief is filed pursuant to consents obtained from all
parties. No person other than amici and their counsel have
authored this brief in whole or in part or made a monetary
contribution toward its preparation or submission.
1
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SEC rules to obtain de novo review of that decision.
17 C.F.R. § 201.410, 201.411. The SEC conducted
“an independent review of the record, except with
respect to those findings not challenged on review.”
Pet. App. 40a. The SEC exercised the power
conferred on it by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA): “On appeal from or review of the initial
decision, the agency has all the powers it would
have in making the initial decision.” 5 U.S.C. §
557(b). In its opinion, the SEC agreed with the ALJ
with respect to most but not all issues. Two
Commissioners dissented with respect to one issue.
Lucia sought review of the SEC decision in
the D.C. Circuit. Lucia argued, inter alia, that the
SEC’s decision was invalid because the ALJ who
presided in the hearing was an inferior officer who
was not appointed in a manner consistent with the
Appointments Clause. Instead, the SEC had
appointed the ALJ in a manner consistent with the
APA. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 provides that “each agency”
that employs ALJs “shall appoint” the ALJs who
work for the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 provides that
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) “shall
by regulation prescribe . . . the qualifications to
be required for appointment [of ALJs].” Acting
under authority delegated by the SEC, the Chief
ALJ at the SEC appointed the ALJ who presided in
this case. That ALJ had previously been
determined by OPM to be qualified to be an ALJ.
A panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the SEC decision on the basis of its
conclusion that SEC ALJs are employees rather
than inferior officers because their decisions at the
conclusion of a hearing are only recommendations
that the SEC is free to accept or reject. Raymond J.
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Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
rehearing en banc denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (2017).
Before the Court granted the writ of
certiorari in this case, the Solicitor General filed a
brief in which he announced that the government
had changed its position and now believes that
ALJs are inferior officers who can only be
appointed by Heads of Departments. The
government expressed its agreement with the
opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere v. SEC,
844 F.3d 1168, rehearing en banc denied, 855 F.3d
1128 (10th Cir. 2016). The Tenth Circuit held that
SEC ALJs are inferior officers even though they
lack the power to make final decisions because
their positions, including their “duties, salary, and
means of appointment,” are established by statute
and because they exercise significant discretion in
carrying out important quasi-judicial functions.
The SEC responded to this change in the
government’s position the next day by issuing an
order in which it ratified the appointments of ALJs
that had previously been made by its Chief ALJ
and ordered its ALJs to reconsider the actions they
had taken in pending proceedings in their new
capacity as appointees of the head of the agency.
Order, In re: Pending Administrative Proceedings
(Nov. 30, 2017).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The history of ALJs—and in particular, the
importance of their independence within agencies,
sheds important light on this case. Amici
respectfully urge this Court to evaluate this case in
light of the congressional purpose of ensuring the
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independence and neutrality of ALJs. These
features, in turn, protect the property and liberty
interests at stake in agency adjudications and,
ultimately, act as checks on agency power.
Congress devoted a substantial amount of
time during the 1930s and 1940s to the question of
how to structure agencies that engage in
adjudication of regulatory disputes. That debate
resulted in unanimous enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. One
of the core features of the APA was a complicated
set of statutory safeguards to assure that the
hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) who were
to preside over most agency hearings did not act in
ways that reflected bias in favor of the agency that
employed them. Congress created a multi-step
process for appointing hearing examiners and
imposed statutory limits on the power of agencies
to manage and remove hearing examiners that
were specifically designed to ensure that they had
an appropriate degree of decisional independence
from the agencies whose cases they were to hear.
This Court issued three opinions during the
period from 1950 to 1955 in which it (1)
acknowledged with obvious approval the
congressional decision to create the position of
hearing examiner with a degree of decisional
independence from the agencies whose cases they
adjudicate, (2) encouraged Congress to use
independent hearing examiners to preside in all
agency hearings, and (3) upheld the initial rules
the Civil Service Commission (later renamed the
Office of Personnel Management) issued to
implement the provisions of the APA that were
intended to assure that hearing examiners have an
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appropriate degree of decisional independence
from the agencies at which they preside.
This case was initiated in response to the
SEC’s use of the discretion Congress conferred on
it in the Dodd-Frank Act to use its ALJs to preside
in hearings in some types of enforcement
proceedings. Previously, such cases were subject to
adjudication exclusively in federal district courts.
The shift of some enforcement cases from federal
courts to the SEC gave rise to complaints that SEC
ALJs were unduly biased in favor of the SEC.
Ironically, to the extent that pro-agency bias is a
concern, changing the status of ALJs as urged by
petitioner would give the agency greater control
over ALJ—precisely the outcome that Lucia
purports to disavow.
The Court’s holding and approach in this
case have major implications for the adjudicative
structure of the federal government. If the Court
were to apply the Tenth Circuit test to the five SEC
ALJs as the basis for a holding that they are
inferior officers, federal courts would be required to
apply the same test to the 1,926 ALJs who perform
analogous functions at other agencies. And it would
almost certainly trigger similar challenges to
decisions made by the thousands of non-ALJ
adjudicators (often referred to as administrative
judges or AJs) who perform analogous functions at
other agencies. Together, ALJs and AJs preside at
hearings in millions of adjudications each year.
If, as seems likely, that iterative process
yielded a series of holdings that many thousand
federal employees with responsibilities that
include presiding at hearings are inferior officers,
federal courts would then have to decide what to do
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about the cases that have been the subject of
hearings presided over by those unconstitutionally
appointed officers. Courts would also have to
decide whether the statutory restrictions on
removal of the members of this large new class of
inferior officers are constitutional, an issue not
before the Court in this case. The point, however,
is that the stakes are sufficiently high to justify a
judicial approach that preserves as much as
possible the congressional design to check agency
power through the use of ALJs.
ARGUMENT
I. THE METHOD OF APPOINTING ALJs AND
THE STATUTORY LIMITS ON MANAGEMENT
AND REMOVAL OF ALJs HAS A RICH
HISTORY.
A. CONGRESS DEVOTED MUCH OF THE 1930s
AND 1940s TO DESIGNING A STRUCTURE IN
WHICH ALJs HAVE AN APPROPRIATE
DEGREE OF DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE.
During the 1930s and 1940s, Congress
devoted a great deal of time and effort to crafting
legislation to govern actions taken by federal
agencies. After fifteen years of debates and studies,
Congress unanimously enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA). See George Shepherd,
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U. L.
Rev. 1557 (1996).
One of the core issues that Congress
resolved when it enacted the APA was the status of
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the hearing examiners who were authorized to
preside over oral evidentiary hearings in
adjudications in the common situation in which the
head of an agency did not personally preside. That
issue was challenging because Congress sought to
accomplish two potentially competing goals.
Members of Congress had received many
complaints that the hearing examiners who
presided in agency hearings prior to enactment of
the APA were biased in favor of the agency and
against the private parties who participated in
those hearings. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial
Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131-132
(1953). Congress responded to that concern by
conferring on the new hearing examiners who
would preside after enactment of the APA some
degree of independence from the agencies for which
they worked. Id. at 132-134.
Congress also wanted to further the
potentially conflicting goal of ensuring that the
agencies themselves would retain control of policy
decisions in implementing their statutory
directions. Congress recognized that hearing
examiners who were sufficiently independent of
the agency that employed them to reduce concerns
of bias had the potential to usurp some of the
policymaking power Congress had conferred on
their agencies. Congress responded by including in
the APA provisions that ensure that agencies
retain the ability to make all of the policy decisions
that might be raised in an adjudication in which a
hearing examiner presides. See Paul Verkuil et al.,
The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Admin.
Conf. of the United States, Recommendations and
Reports, Vol. II, 770, 801-802 (1992).
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During its fifteen years of deliberation about
what became the APA, Congress considered many
potential ways of reconciling the tension between
those two potentially conflicting goals. Congress
eventually settled on a combination of statutory
provisions that are designed to further both goals
simultaneously. The APA includes provisions that
are designed to confer a degree of independence on
hearing examiners by regulating the agency
processes of hiring, managing, and removing
hearing examiners. But it also includes a provision
that ensures that agencies retain complete control
of the policy implications of adjudicatory hearings
by conferring on the agency the authority to
substitute the agency’s decision for the initial
decision of the hearing examiner. Except for some
changes in terminology and compensation,
Congress has not made material changes in those
provisions since Congress enacted them in 1946.
In the APA, Congress gave agencies the
power to appoint hearing examiners, 5 U.S.C. §
3105, but it coupled that power with the power of
the Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”)
to determine who is qualified to be a hearing
examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 5372. The Commission
implemented a merit-based system for determining
eligibility to be a hearing examiner, and the
agencies appointed hearing examiners from the list
of applicants that the Commission determined to
be eligible. As a result, although ALJs usually work
for a single agency, they become eligible to be ALJs
through a process overseen by the Commission.
In 1972, the Commission changed the name
of hearing examiners to administrative law judges
(ALJs). Change of Title to Administrative Law
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Judge, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972). In
1978, Congress ratified that decision by statute
and renamed the Civil Service Commission the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Pub. L.
No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978). (In the remainder
of this brief we will use the terms hearing examiner
and ALJ interchangeably.)
The vast majority of ALJs, 1,655 out of
1,926, work for the Social Security Administration
(SSA). Because of frequent significant increases in
its caseload, SSA often needs to hire large numbers
of new ALJs. When SSA needs to hire more ALJs
than the number of applicants that OPM has
determined to be qualified to be ALJs, SSA asks
OPM to reopen the process of determining who is
eligible to be an ALJ. OPM responds to SSA’s need
by reopening the eligibility determination process.
Through that process, OPM creates a new list of
applicants eligible to be ALJs that is long enough
to allow SSA to hire the number of new ALJs it
needs to adjudicate the constantly increasing
number of contested cases in which someone claims
to be entitled to social security disability benefits.
Agencies like the SEC routinely hire ALJs who
have previously worked for SSA. Thus, the initial
appointment of an ALJ is usually made by SSA
from the list of eligible applicants created by OPM.
Other agencies then choose ALJs from the large
population of ALJs who work for SSA.
Congress also limited agency power to
manage hearing examiners in several ways that
are designed to confer a degree of independence on
them, thereby protecting the rights of the regulated
entities involved in adjudications. Congress’s goal
was to reduce the risk of pro-agency bias in the
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process of presiding in a hearing, checking
agencies’ power by precluding them from using
managerial tools as means of inducing hearing
examiners to conduct adjudicatory hearings in
ways that favor the agency and disfavor the private
parties who participate in the hearings. Thus, the
employing agency cannot discipline a hearing
examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 7521; cannot determine the
compensation of a hearing examiner, 5 U.S.C. §
5372; cannot assign a case to a hearing examiner
except in rotation, 5 U.S.C. § 3105; cannot assign a
hearing examiner any duties that are inconsistent
with the duties and responsibilities of a hearing
examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 3105; and cannot subject a
hearing examiner to supervision or direction by
any agency employee who engages in “the
performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
Finally, a disciplinary action can be taken
against an ALJ “only for good cause established
and determined by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) on the record after opportunity for
hearing before the Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7521. Thus,
although the SEC can initiate a proceeding against
an ALJ, only the independent MSPB can impose
any form of discipline against him or her.
At the same time that Congress protected
the integrity of the hearing process by conferring a
degree of independence on hearing examiners,
Congress ensured that agencies retained complete
control over the legal basis and policy content of
any decision in an adjudication. Congress
accomplished that goal by providing that a hearing
examiner can make only an initial decision and
that the agency has complete discretion to replace
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it: “On appeal from or review of the initial decision,
the agency has all the powers which it would have
in making the initial decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
This Court has reinforced that congressional
decision by holding that the initial decision
qualifies only as part of the record on which the
court must base its review. Universal Camera v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493-497 (1951).
B. THIS COURT ISSUED A SERIES OF
DECISIONS IN THE 1950S IN WHICH IT
ENDORSED THE LEGAL REGIME
GOVERNING ALJS THAT CONGRESS
CREATED.
Shortly after Congress enacted the APA, this
Court issued a series of decisions regarding the
qualified independence of hearing examiners in
which it praised the APA and urged Congress to
use it as a model for all agency decision-making. In
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,
345 U.S. 128 (1953), the Court upheld the initial
rules issued by the Civil Service Commission to
govern the compensation and tenure of hearing
examiners, and the rules governing assignment of
cases to hearing examiners, over an objection by an
association of hearing examiners that the rules
were not adequately protective of the independent
status of hearing examiners that the APA was
enacted to protect.
The six-Justice majority described the
reasons Congress conferred qualified independence
on hearing examiners in the APA: “Many
complaints were voiced against the actions of
hearing examiners, it being charged that they were
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mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient
to the agency heads in making their proposed
findings of fact and recommendations.” Id. at 131.
The majority described studies that supported the
complaints of bias and that urged Congress to
make hearing examiners “partially independent of
the agency by which they were employed.” Id. at
131. The majority then described the congressional
deliberations about the best ways of accomplishing
that agreed-upon goal, and described with
apparent approval the treatment of hearing
examiners in the APA: “Several proposals were
considered, and in the final bill Congress provided
that hearing examiners should be given
independence and tenure in the existing Civil
Service system.” Id. at 131-32.
The majority’s description of the APA’s
treatment of hearing examiners and its
characterization of the status of hearing examiners
left no doubt that the majority understood and
approved of the congressional decision to confer
qualified independence on hearing examiners:
Congress intended to make hearing
examiners ‘a special class of semiindependent subordinate hearing officers’ by
vesting control of their compensation,
promotion and tenure in the Civil Service
Commission to a much greater extent than
in the case of other federal employees.
Id. at 132. The majority upheld the Civil Service
rules based on its conclusion that the rules were
consistent with congressional intent:
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The position of hearing examiner is not a
constitutionally protected position. It is a
creature of congressional enactment. The
respondents have no vested right to
positions as examiners. They hold their
posts by such tenure as Congress sees fit to
give them. Their positions may be regulated
completely by Congress, or Congress may
delegate the exercise of its regulatory power,
under proper standards, to the Civil Service
Commission, which it has done in his case.
Id. at 133.
The three dissenting Justices also implicitly
approved of the congressional decision to confer
qualified independence on hearing examiners.
However, they would have held the rules invalid
because of their belief that the rules should have
gone even further in conferring qualified
independence on hearing examiners:
The Administrative Procedure Act was
designed to give trial examiners in the
various administrative agencies a new
status of freedom from agency control.
Henceforth they were to be ‘very nearly the
equivalent of judges even though operating
within the Federal system of administrative
justice.’ Agencies were stripped of power to
remove examiners working with them.
Henceforth removal could be effected only
after hearings by the Civil Service
Commission. That same Commission was
empowered to prescribe an examiner’s
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compensation
independently
of
recommendations or ratings by the agency in
which the examiner worked. And to deprive
regulatory agencies of all power to pick
particular examiners for particular cases, §
11 of the Act commanded that examiners be
‘assigned to cases in rotation so far as
practicable * * *.’ I agree with the District
Court and the Court of Appeals that the
regulations here sustained go a long way
toward frustrating the purposes of Congress
to give examiners independence.
Id. at 144 (citation omitted) (Black, J., dissenting).
The Court was even more forceful in its
approval of, and praise for, the congressional
decision to confer qualified independence on
hearing examiners in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). The question before
the Court was whether the APA provisions
applicable to hearing examiners applied to
deportation proceedings. The Court held that they
did even though no statute explicitly made the APA
applicable to those hearings.
The Court began by describing the
widespread complaints of bias that led to the
enactment of the APA and to its treatment of
hearing examiners as independent of the agencies
at which they preside. It also cited to the many
studies that had substantiated those complaints
and that had urged statutory changes to reduce the
pro-agency bias. It then described the years of
study and deliberation that led to enactment of the
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APA by unanimous votes in both Houses of
Congress. Id. at 37-45. The Court summarized the
process through which the APA was enacted: “The
Act thus represents a long period of study and
strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought
contentions, and enacts a formula upon which
opposing social and political forces have come to
rest.” Id. at 40.
The Court then compared the unfair and
biased hearing that the government had provided
in the case before the Court with the hearing before
an impartial hearing examiner that the APA
requires. Id. at 45-47. The Court even suggested
that the Constitution might compel an agency to
use the APA hearing procedures:
The
constitutional
requirement
of
procedural due process of law derives from
the same source as Congress’ power to
legislate and, where applicable, permeates
every valid enactment of that body. . . .
We would hardly attribute to Congress a
purpose to be less scrupulous about the
fairness of a hearing necessitated by the
Constitution than one granted by it as a
matter of expediency.
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act
might again bring it into constitutional
jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a
hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a
tribunal which meets at least currently
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prevailing standards of impartiality.
Id. at 49-50.
The Court concluded that the APA
represented an effort by Congress to set forth the
“currently prevailing standards of impartiality”
and thereby to codify the minimum requirements
of due process. Id. at 50. Based on that conclusion,
the Court held that the provisions in the APA
relating to hearing examiners applied to
deportation proceedings. Id. at 51. In later cases,
the Court relied on the reasoning in Wong Yang
Sung as the basis to hold that the APA applies to
hearings under the Interstate Commerce Act, Riss
& Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 907 (1951), and to Post
Office fraud hearings, Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S.
804 (1952).
Admittedly, the Court eventually retreated
from its suggestion that the APA codified due
process when Congress explicitly rejected that
interpretation of the Act in the process of enacting
a deportation statute that authorized hearings that
fell short of the procedural safeguards reflected in
the APA. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
But the Court never retreated from its belief that
the APA adjudication provisions created a model of
fairness by which all other agency adjudicatory
procedures should be judged. Indeed, the Court
upheld the procedures Congress authorized in
deportation proceedings largely because it believed
that Congress was “drawing liberally on the
analogous provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act and adapting them to the
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deportation process.” Id. at 310.
II. ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF ALJS
SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
OVERRIDING GOAL OF MINIMIZING THE
RISK OF PRO-AGENCY BIAS.
There are 1,931 ALJs who preside in
adjudicatory hearings at present. Five are
employees of the SEC. The other 1,926 preside in
adjudicatory hearings conducted by 30 other
agencies. 2 If this Court holds that ALJs are
inferior officers, agencies and courts would then
have to decide whether to acquiesce in agencyproposed methods of rehearing those millions of
adjudicatory disputes, including those by the
thousands of AJs whose rulings would be subject to
the same challenge brought here. Even assuming
some agencies could remedy the Appointments
Clause deficiency in a manner similar to the SEC’s
approach, broader considerations related to
ensuring ALJs’ independence should not be
overlooked.
The case before the Court is one of the many
cases that were triggered by the SEC’s use of the
discretion Congress conferred on the agency to
pursue some types of enforcement actions in
adjudications before ALJs, rather than federal
district judges. Professor Urska Velikonja has
provided a detailed description of the manner in
See U.S. OPM, ALJs by Agency (Mar. 2017),
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/adminstrativelaw-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency.
2
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which section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862
(2010), enabled the SEC to make greater use of
ALJs in some types of enforcement cases and led to
the many cases in which parties who lost in those
cases sought review based on alleged constitutional
flaws in the appointment of the ALJs who presided
in those cases. Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s
Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical
Investigation, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 315, 317-24 (2017).
In each of those cases, the SEC engaged in
independent de novo review of the ALJ’s decision
and concluded that the defendant had violated
securities laws, and it imposed sanctions on the
defendant that included civil penalties. In each
case, the party that was the subject of the sanctions
sought judicial review of the SEC action and
argued, inter alia, that the action was invalid
because the ALJ was an inferior officer who had not
been appointed in a manner consistent with the
Appointments Clause.
In some of the cases, the party that was
subject to the sanctions also argued that the SEC
action was invalid because the for-cause limit on
the SEC’s ability to remove an ALJ violates the
Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause, as this
Court interpreted those Clauses in Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). Velikonja, 92 Wash. L.
Rev. at 328-30. The implicit, and in some cases
explicit, allegation that ALJs are biased against
the private party underlies the Appointments
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Clause claims in these cases, but the private
parties do not explain why they believe there is a
causal relationship between the method of
appointment and the presence or absence of a proagency bias.
The claims that SEC ALJs are biased in
favor of the agency echo the widespread claims of
bias that provided the impetus for Congress’s
decision to enact the APA. That statute reduced
significantly the potential for ALJ bias in the
process of presiding over agency adjudications.
Ironically, the claims of bias spawned by the SEC’s
decision to bring some enforcement actions before
ALJs, rather than federal district judges, have
been coupled with the argument that SEC ALJs
should be appointed by the agencies where they
preside and should be removable at will by the
agencies where they preside.
It is hard to imagine a worse fit between an
alleged problem in decision-making and a proposed
remedy for that problem. If this Court makes a
decision that cascades into a legal regime in which
agencies have greater discretion in the process of
appointing ALJs and have the discretion to remove
ALJs without establishing any cause for removal,
it will have eliminated many of the safeguards
against
pro-agency
bias
that
Congress
incorporated in the APA and that this Court
praised as important mechanisms to protect the
due process rights of the private parties who
participate in agency hearings. That, of course,
would increase the risk that SEC ALJs will make
decisions that reflect pro-agency bias in their roles
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as presiding officers.
A holding that SEC ALJs are inferior officers
who must be appointed by heads of departments
would not necessarily conflict with the
congressional goal that was the basis for the
safeguards of ALJ independence that Congress
incorporated in the APA as long as the initial
determinations of basic qualifications continued to
be made by OPM. The APA authorizes agencies to
appoint ALJs, and this Court has held that the
SEC qualifies as a “head of department,” as that
term is used in the Appointments Clause. Free
Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 512-13. Such a
holding would be consistent with the critical role
that Congress assigned the OPM in determining
the people who have the qualifications required to
be eligible for appointment by the SEC. Congress
often limits the scope of the power of appointment
by qualifying it in various ways, and no court has
ever held that such a limit violates the
Appointments Clause. 3
But the potential removal ramifications of
this series of SEC challenges cannot be ignored,
because they are critical to the broader
In FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F. 3d 821, 824-25
(D.C. Cir. 1993), the D.C. Circuit held that the constitutional
validity of the common statutory restriction on the
President’s power to appoint no more than a bare majority of
the members of a multi-member agency is not justiciable.
This Court dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari that
was filed in the case on the basis that the FEC lacks the
power to represent the United States in the Supreme Court.
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 90 (1994).
3
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considerations of neutrality underlying the ALJ
provisions of the APA. Were this Court to hold
ALJs to be inferior officers without using
cautiously cabined analysis, a later court would
likely conclude that the statutory for-cause limit on
an agency’s power to remove an ALJ violates
separation of powers. Such a holding would have a
devastating effect on the decisional independence
of ALJs. As this Court has recognized, the power to
remove a government official creates a “here and
now subservience” between the government official
and the individual or institution that has the power
to remove the official. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 720, 730 (1986). That subservient relationship
is particularly powerful when the entity that has
the power to remove the official is not required to
state a cause for removing the official. If the SEC
could remove an ALJ without having shown good
cause for removal, the risk that SEC ALJs would
behave in a manner that is biased in favor of the
agency would increase dramatically.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the outcome of the
Appointments Clause issue, the Court should
resolve the issue in a manner that is respectful of
the independent relationship between ALJs and
the agencies that employ them that Congress
created by passing the APA.

22

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.
COUNSEL OF RECORD
ROBERT GLICKSMAN
EMILY HAMMOND
ALAN B. MORRISON
JONATHAN R. SIEGEL
THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL
2000 H STREET NW
Washington, DC 20052
(703) 304-1623
rpierce@law.gwu.edu
February 28, 2018

Add. 1

ADDENDUM: LIST OF PARTICPATING
SCHOLARS
William D. Araiza
Brooklyn Law School
Michael Asimow
Stanford Law School
Bernard W. Bell
Rutgers Law School
Marshall Breger
Columbus School of Law
The Catholic University of America
Bryan T. Camp
Texas Tech University School of Law
Joel B. Eisen
University of Richmond School of Law
Samuel Estreicher
NYU School of Law
Steve C. Gold
Rutgers Law School
Natalie Gomez-Velez
CUNY School of Law
Mark H. Grunewald
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Add. 2

Emily Hammond
George Washington University School of Law
William Funk
Lewis & Clark Law School
Robert Glicksman
George Washington University School of Law
Jeffrey Lubbers
American University, Washington College of Law
Jerry Mashaw
Yale Law School
Joel A. Mintz
Nov Southeastern University College of Law
Alan B. Morrison
George Washington University School of Law
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
George Washington University School of Law
Andrew F. Popper
American University, Washington College of Law
Edward P. Richards
Louisiana State University Law Center
Michael Sant’Ambrogio
Michigan State University College of Law
Joshua I. Schwartz
George Washington University School of Law

Add. 3

Sid Shapiro
Wake Forest University School of Law
Allen E. Shoenberger
Loyola Chicago Law School
Jonathan R. Siegel
George Washington University School of Law
Peter L. Strauss
Columbia Law School
Paul R. Verkuil
Senior Fellow and Former Chair, Administrative
Conference of the United States
Keith Werhan
Tulane Law School
Adam S. Zimmerman
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles

